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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
 
NICK COONS, et al.,     ) 
            )  No. 2:10-cv-1714-GMS 
      Plaintiffs,  )     
 v.          )  Plaintiffs’ Reply in Further Support of   
           )  their Motion for Summary Judgment and   
TIMOTHY GEITHNER, et al.,  )   in Response in Opposition to Defendants’ 
           )  for Summary Judgment 
      Defendants.  ) 
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INTRODUCTION 
 As Plaintiffs predicted, Defendants‘ Motion for Summary Judgment is nearly identical to 
their Motion to Dismiss.  The only addition to their Summary Judgment is their L.R. 56.1(a) 
Statement, which is 50 paragraphs long and contains references to 54 exhibits consisting of 
more than 830 pages of exhibit material.  Nonetheless, by their own admission, Defendants‘ 
Statement is for the most part wholly immaterial to this case.  (See Defs.‘ Opp‘n. Mem. Summ. 
J. and Cross Mem. Summ. J. 6 (―Defs.‘ Mem.‖)) (―This case presents pure questions of law.‖)  
As such, Plaintiffs have moved to dismiss it for failure to comply with L.R. 56.1(a).  
  Given the extensive and redundant briefing in this case, Plaintiffs will respond to a 
limited number of issues raised in Defendants‘ August 10, 2011, Motion and Memorandum (and 
the pleadings incorporated therein).  The issues addressed herein, in turn, are: 1) the Court‘s 
authority to determine the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
(PPACA or the Act), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) 
(HCERA)
1
; 2) Congress‘s enactment of the Individual Mandate purportedly pursuant to the 
General Welfare Clause; 3) the Individual Mandate‘s non-preemption of the Health Care 
Freedom Act; 4) Congress‘s unlawful delegation of legislative authority to IPAB; and 4) lack of 
severability.
2
  
                            
1
All citations herein to PPACA are to PPACA, as amended by HCERA.  
2At the conclusion, Plaintiffs also address Defendants‘ footnoted reference regarding a purported 
need for discovery relating to Mr. Coons.   
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 I. THE COURTS HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO REIGN IN 
CONGRESS WHEN IT EXCEEDS ITS ARTICLE I POWER 
  
 In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants characterize Plaintiffs‘ challenge to 
PPACA as merely a ―dispute‖ over Congress‘s ―policy judgments.‖   (Defs.‘ Mem. 2.)  
However, to characterize this as a case over policy differences is to diminish constitutional 
issues that have gripped the nation since PPACA‘s enactment.  Indeed, Plaintiffs‘ case, along 
with the other cases pending around the country that challenge PPACA, seek to strike down a 
law that stands as one of the greatest intrusions into individual liberty this nation has ever seen.    
 As the Supreme Court has observed, ―[T]he judicial authority to determine the 
constitutionality of laws, in cases and controversies, is based on the premise that the ‗powers of 
the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, 
the constitution is written.‘‖ City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (quoting 
Marbury v.Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)).  As the Eleventh Circuit recently 
explained in Florida v. United States Dep’t Health and Human Servs., ―the judiciary is called 
upon not only to interpret the laws, but at times to enforce the Constitution‘s limits on the power 
of Congress, even when that power is used to address an intractable problem.‖  Florida v. 
United States Dep’t Health and Human Servs., __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 3519178 *39 (11th Cir. 
Aug. 12, 2011).  While these structural limitations are often discussed in terms of federalism, 
their ultimate goal is the protection of individual liberty.  Id. at 41.  See also, Bond v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (―Federalism secures the freedom of the individual.‖); New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (―The Constitution does not protect the 
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sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political 
entities. . . . To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state 
governments for the protection of individuals.‖).  
 Despite the clear role and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution‘s limits on 
Congress‘s power, Defendants ask this Court to review PPACA with modesty (Defs.‘ Mem. 7), 
and to defer to Congress‘s ―superior capacity to make empirical judgments and operational 
choices and the appropriate structural separation between the judicial and legislative powers.‖  
(Id. at 8.)  However, as set forth above, it is the Constitution, as enforced by the judiciary, and 
not Congress itself, that checks Congress‘s exercise of authority.   
 In arguing that ―[c]ourts accord broad deference to the means adopted by Congress to 
advance its legitimate regulatory goals‖ (Id. at 17), Defendants conflate the deference courts 
afford Congress in determining whether in the aggregate an activity has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce, with the threshold question of whether Congress has Article I authority to 
regulate the subject matter in the first place.  Certainly, ―[r]ational basis review is not triggered 
by the mere fact of Congress‘s invocation of Article I power; rather, the Supreme Court has 
applied rational basis review to a more specific question under the Commerce Clause: whether 
Congress has a ‗rational basis‘ for concluding that the regulated ‗activities, when taken in the 
aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce.‘‖  See Florida, 2011 WL 3519178 * 55 
(emphasis added).   ―[C]ourts must initially assess whether the subject matter targeted by the 
regulation is suitable for aggregation in the first place.‖  Id.  
Case 2:10-cv-01714-GMS   Document 70    Filed 08/29/11   Page 7 of 26
 4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 Congressional findings relevant to the substantial effects analysis do not even come into 
play here because no economic activity is being regulated.  Congress cannot expand its 
Commerce Clause powers by making factual findings – even extensive ones – about the ultimate 
economic consequences of the behavior (or absence of behavior) it seeks to control.  See United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (―[T]he existence of congressional findings is not 
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.‖).  That is 
why United States v. Lopez begins not with the substantial effects test, but rather with ―first 
principles,‖ reaffirming the ―constitutionally mandated division of authority [that] ‗was adopted 
by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties.‘‖ 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995) 
(citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (2009)).  See also Florida, 2011 WL 3519178  
*40.  
 The Eleventh Circuit squarely addressed the congressional deference issue:  
Our respected dissenting colleague says that the majority: (1) ―has ignored the 
broadpower of Congress‖; (2) ―has ignored the Supreme Court‘s expansive 
reading of the Commerce Clause‖; (3) ―presume[s] to sit as a superlegislature‖; (4) 
―misapprehends the role of a reviewing court‖; and (5) ignores that ―as nonelected 
judicial officers, we are not afforded the opportunity to rewrite statutes we don‘t 
like.‖  See Dissenting Op. [*83, 93 n.7, 97].  We do not respond to these 
contentions, especially given (1) our extensive and exceedingly careful review of 
the Act, Supreme Court precedent, and the parties‘ arguments, and (2) our holding 
that the Act, despite significant challenges to this massive and sweeping federal 
regulation and spending, falls within the ambit and prerogative of Congress‘s 
broad commerce power, except for one section, § 5000A. We do, however, refuse 
to abdicate our constitutional duty when Congress has acted beyond its 
enumerated Commerce Clause power in mandating that Americans, from cradle to 
grave, purchase an insurance product from a private company. 
 
Id. at *83 n.145 (emphasis added). 
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 As Plaintiffs addressed in their Summary Judgment Memorandum, the Mandate does not 
regulate ―consumption‖ of health care services by conditioning receipt of health care on any sort 
of payment or insurance.  The Mandate is in fact silent about how individuals must pay for 
medical services if and when they seek them.  If the Mandate were actually regulating people 
who use health care services, as Defendants argue, then it would have to be conditioned on 
actual consumption of health care services, which it is not.  Instead, it requires everyone to 
purchase health insurance and provides no opt-out provision for those who do not consume 
health care services.  (See Pls.‘ Mem. Summ. J. 19-20 (Plfs.‘ Mem.‖))   
The individual mandate does not regulate behavior at the point of consumption.  
Indeed, the language of the individual mandate does not truly regulate ―how and 
when health care is paid for.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A).  It does not even 
require those who consume health care to pay for it with insurance when doing so. 
Instead, the language of the individual mandate in fact regulates a related, but 
different, subject matter: ―when health insurance is purchased.‖  If an individual‘s 
participation in the health care market is uncertain, their participation in the 
insurance market is even more so. 
 
Florida, 2011 WL 3519178 *51. 
 
 That is why the Eleventh Circuit framed the issue before it as ―whether Congress may 
regulate individuals outside the stream of commerce, on the theory that those ‗economic and 
financial decisions‘ to avoid commerce themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.‖  Id. 
at 49.  In answering that question, the Court found that ―[a]pplying aggregation principles to an 
individual‘s decision not to purchase a product would expand the substantial effects doctrine to 
one of unlimited scope.  Given the economic reality of our national marketplace, any person‘s 
decision not to purchase a good would, when aggregated, substantially affect interstate.‖  Id. 
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 Even assuming that decisions not to buy insurance substantially affect interstate 
commerce, that fact alone hardly renders them a suitable subject for regulation.  See, e.g., 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 (emphasis added) (―We accordingly reject the argument that 
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s 
aggregate effect on interstate commerce. . . . Instead, what matters is the regulated subject 
matter‘s connection to interstate commerce.  That nexus is lacking here.‖)  Florida, 2011 WL 
3519178 *49. 
 No amassing of congressional findings can create Article I authority where it does not 
exist.  Accordingly, the question for this Court is whether Congress exceeded its Article I 
authority in enacting PPACA; and the answer to this, Plaintiffs respectfully submit, is yes.  
 Defendants also incorrectly characterize the Necessary and Proper Clause issue, first in 
their Motion to Dismiss (Defs.‘ Mot. Dismiss 28), and then as identically reiterated in their 
Summary Judgment Memorandum.  (Defs.‘ Mem. 18.)  Defendants cite to United States v. 
Comstock for the proposition that in determining whether Congress has acted properly pursuant 
to the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Supreme Court considered ―whether the means chosen 
are ‗substantially adapted‘ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power or 
under other powers that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to implement.‖  (Id.) 
(quoting 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1957 (2010) (citations omitted)).  But Defendants‘ briefings 
misunderstand this inquiry.  Indeed, a congressional act is only appropriately adapted to an 
enumerated power if it is consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.  (Pls.‘ Mem. 
24) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)).  As Plaintiffs have previously 
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discussed, the Individual Mandate is not authorized by either.  (Pls.‘ Mem. 24-7.)  Furthermore, 
although Defendants cite to Comstock, they fail to acknowledge the five factors that the Court 
relied on in determining whether the law at issue was necessary and proper.  See Comstock, 130 
S. Ct. at 1965.  See also Florida, 2011 WL 3519178 *36 (acknowledging the five factors).  As 
Plaintiffs have previously explained, those factors ―militate against the Individual Mandate‘s 
generalized police power.‖  (See Pls.‘ Mem. 27-8.) 
 Defendants claim that ―[n]o proper basis exists . . . to override Congress‘s judgment 
about the appropriate means to achieve its legitimate regulatory objectives.‖  (Defs.‘ Mem. 18.)  
But as the Eleventh Circuit recognized, courts cannot give 
Congress carte blanche to enact unconstitutional regulations so long as such 
enactments were part of a broader, comprehensive regulatory scheme.  We do not 
construe the Supreme Court's ―larger regulatory scheme‖ doctrine as a magic 
words test, where Congress's statement that a regulation is ―essential‖ thereby 
immunizes its enactment from constitutional inquiry.  Such a reading would 
eviscerate the Constitution's enumeration of powers and vest Congress with a 
general police power. 
 
Florida, 2011 WL 3519178 *64. 
 Finally, Defendants note that the Individual Mandate was implemented ―in order to avoid 
the externalization of costs.‖  (Defs.‘ Mem. 19.)  But the costs the Mandate seeks to internalize 
are imposed by the government itself.  The Individual Mandate was employed to counteract 
regulatory costs, not to enable the execution of a proper law‘s regulations.  Florida, 2011 WL 
3519178 *65.  The Necessary and Proper Clause may serve as a proper vehicle only for the 
latter, not the former. 
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 II.  CONGRESS HAS NO GENERAL WELFARE POWER TO ENACT 
  THE MANDATE BECAUSE IT IS NOT A TAX 
 
Defendants continue to contend that Congress enacted the Individual Mandate pursuant 
to its ―independent‖ power under the General Welfare Clause (Defs.‘ Mem. 30), despite the fact 
that the General Welfare Clause is a limitation on Congress‘s tax power (see Pls.‘ Mem. 29) 
(citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)), and despite the fact that ―all of the federal 
courts, which have otherwise reached sharply divergent conclusions on the constitutionality of 
the individual mandate, have spoken on this issue with clarion uniformity . . . that the individual 
mandate operates as a regulatory penalty, not a tax.‖  Florida, 2011 WL 3519178 *68 (citing 
cases). 
Defendants claim that if a statute produces any revenue, it is a tax.  (Defs.‘ Mem. 31.)  By 
Defendants‘ logic, then, Congress could ignore the enumerated powers of Article I and wield a 
plenary police power, so long as it tacks on a penalty that incidentally raises some revenue.  But 
as ―the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, there is a firm distinction between a tax and a 
penalty.‖  Florida, 2011 WL 3519178 *69.  Again, Plaintiffs have argued, and every court 
considering the issue has agreed, that the Individual Mandate is not a tax and was not passed 
pursuant to Congress‘s power to tax for the general welfare.  (See Pls.‘ Mem. 29-34.) 
 III. IPAB STANDS AS THE MOST SWEEPING DELEGATION OF 
   CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY IN HISTORY 
 
 Congress delegated to IPAB the unprecedented power to legislate, free of meaningful 
oversight by the legislative, executive or judicial branches.  The Independent Payment Advisory 
Board is indeed ―independent,‖ but in the worst sense of the word: it is independent of 
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Congress, the President, the judiciary and the American people.  It is thus immune from our 
Constitution‘s system of checks and balances that protects our nation against tyranny.  See 
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996). 
 Defendants cite to §§ 1395kkk(c)(2)(B) and (c)(2)(A) of PPACA‘s IPAB provisions in 
support of their argument that there are ―pages of detailed requirements‖ that ―establish the 
required ‗intelligible principle[s]‘‖ to support the delegation.  (Defs.‘ Mem. 36.)  First 
Defendants point to subsection (c)(2)(B), claiming that it ―specifies a list of ‗considerations‘ that 
the Board must take into account.‖  (Id.)  However, while the statute does state a list of 
requirements that IPAB‘s legislative proposals must meet, the problem is that the statute does 
not provide boundaries beyond which IPAB‘s legislative proposals may not go.     
 Defendants also point to § 1395kkk(c)(2)(A), which they claim ―prohibits the Board from 
making certain types of recommendations.‖  (Id. at 36.)  But these so-called prohibitions can 
only be as effective as they are defined, and they are undefined in the most serious of ways.  For 
example, while PPACA purportedly prohibits IPAB from including in its proposals ―any 
recommendation to ration care,‖ the term ―ration‖ is in fact undefined.  (c)(2)(A)(ii).  That 
means IPAB and IPAB alone will be free to define rationing, with nothing to constrain it.  In 
practice, therefore, if IPAB determines that a particular medicine or treatment is too costly or  
treatments given to persons of a certain age will not be reimbursed, no court will be able to stop 
it and the hurdles Congress will face in trying to reverse IPAB‘s legislation will be nearly 
insurmountable.   
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 Defendants fail to cite a single example of a congressional delegation that rises to scope 
and breadth of Congress‘s delegation of legislative authority to IPAB.  This includes the 
delegations at issue in the two cases Defendants cited without explanation in their 
Memorandum. (Defs.‘ Mem. 37.)  Specifically, Defendants cite to New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. 
United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-5 (1932), and Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 
1431, 1436-38 (9th Cir. 1996), claiming that these cases establish that the ―Supreme Court and 
the Ninth Circuit have upheld statutes containing far broader delegations‖ than the delegation of 
congressional authority to IPAB.  (Defs.‘ Mem. 36.)  However, the delegations in these cases are 
in fact readily distinguishable.  First, the very fact that the judicial branch was reviewing the 
orders and regulations issued by the now-extinct Interstate Commerce Commission, see New 
York Cent. Sec. Corp., 287 U.S. at 19 (plaintiffs ―sought to set aside [the ICC‘s] orders upon the 
ground that the Commission had exceeded its authority‖), and the Treasury Department, see 
Freedom to Travel Campaign, 82 F.3d at 1433-34 (plaintiff ―challenges the Cuban Asset 
Control Regulations which restrain its right to travel to Cuba‖), distinguishes those commissions 
from IPAB, over which the courts are prohibited from exercising such review.   
 Moreover, the Freedom to Travel case presents an even more compelling distinction 
because it involves the delegation of foreign affairs authority, which, as the Court declared, is 
given ―even broader deference than in the domestic arena.‖  82 F.3d at 1438.  In fact, the Court 
opined that ―[t]he level of deference is so much greater here that a delegation improper 
domestically [such as to IPAB], may be valid in the foreign arena.‖  Id.   
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 Finally, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs and the amicus are ―wrong to say that the 
congressional review procedures are the only way that Congress may exert control over the 
Board‘s recommendations.‖  (Defs.‘ Mem. 37.)  In support of this argument, Defendants point to 
―fast-track‖ ―parliamentary procedures‖ that ―ensure Congress, should it choose to do so, has 
sufficient time to consider its own legislative alternative to IPAB‘s recommendations.‖  (Id.) 
 The fact is that those so-called ―fast track procedures,‖ coupled with the anti-repeal 
provision, are the only ways Congress can even try to restrain IPAB.  But far from being ―fast 
track,‖ they pose nearly insurmountable hurdles to meaningful congressional oversight.  
IPAB‘s overarching design is preventing Congress from suspending the rules governing changes 
to IPAB‘s legislation; blocking ways Congress can offer alternatives to IPAB‘s legislation; and 
preventing, except for a short window of time in 2017, the repeal of IPAB altogether.  One 
example of such oversight-killing provisions is the statute‘s voting requirements of a super-
majority of all sworn members any time Congress wants to supersede IPAB legislation, or 
repeal it (which can only occur in 2017).  Another example is the statute‘s provision of only two 
ways that an IPAB proposal does not become law: 1. if Congress successfully amends an IPAB 
proposal pursuant to the nearly insurmountable and truncated legislative rules and procedures 
allowed by the statue, § 1395kkk(e)(3)(A)(i); or 2. the implementation year is 2020 and a joint 
resolution described in the Act had been enacted not later than August 15, 2017. § 
1395kkk(e)(3)(A)(ii).  As for Defendants‘ proclamation that ―Congress can set its own rules‖ 
(Defs.‘ Mem. 37), IPAB‘s anti-repeal provision is not merely an internal house procedure.   To 
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the contrary, pursuant to § 1395kkk(d)(5)(A), the anti-repeal provision was not enacted as an 
exercise of Congress‘s rulemaking power.3  
 The creation of IPAB represents the most sweeping delegation of congressional authority 
in history, a delegation that is anathema to our constitutional system of Separation of Powers 
and to responsible, accountable, democratic lawmaking.  IPAB is insulated from congressional, 
presidential, judicial and electoral accountability to a degree never before seen.  It is the totality 
of the factors insulating IPAB from our nation‘s system of checks and balances that renders it 
constitutionally objectionable.
4
  Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that IPAB is 
unconstitutional and should be struck down. 
 IV.  THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE DOES NOT PREEMPT THE HEALTH  
  CARE FREEDOM ACT 
 
Article XXVII, § 2, of the Arizona Constitution, known as the Health Care Freedom Act 
(HCFA) provides that a ―law or rule shall not compel, directly or indirectly, any person, 
employer or health care provider to participate in any health care system.‖  Defendants argue 
that because Congress made clear that the Individual Mandate is essential to ensuring the 
viability of PPACA‘s guaranteed-issue and community-rating reforms, PPACA must preempt 
                            
3For a full discussion on this matter, see Plaintiffs‘ Reply in Further Support of their Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction 6 (Dkt. 28), which was incorporated into their Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
4
Plaintiffs correct herein an error in their June 20, 2011, Combined Memorandum, at page 44, 
where Plaintiffs cite United States v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d. 1037, 1041-45 (9th Cir. 1992).  The 
passage should correctly read: ―Just as the lack of judicial review does not by itself render a 
delegation unconstitutional, as was the case in Bozarov, the presence of judicial review can 
weigh in favor of upholding a statute,‖ when the Court considers a delegation under the totality 
of the factors analysis.  
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state laws, including Arizona‘s HCFA, which protect an individual‘s right not to purchase 
government-mandated and regulated insurance.  (See Defs.‘ Mot. Dismiss 54); (Defs.‘ Reply 
Mot. Dismiss 23.) 
 However, it bears repeating here that it is the Constitution, as enforced by the judiciary, 
and not Congress itself, that ultimately determines whether Congress via the Individual Mandate 
supersedes what has been traditionally a state-based concern.  Indeed, ―the regulation of health 
and safety matters is primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern.‖  Florida, 2011 WL 
3519178 *60 (quoting Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 
(1985)).  Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that ―health care‖ is an area of traditional state 
concern.   Florida, 2011 WL 3519178 *60 (citing Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 
U.S. 355, 387 (2002)) (―referring to ‗the field of health care‘ as ‗a subject of traditional state 
regulation‘‖).  In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit may well have been addressing the Individual 
Mandate‘s effect on Arizona‘s Health Care Freedom Act when it held that ―encroachment upon 
 . . . areas of traditional state concerns . . . strengthens the inference that the individual mandate 
exceeds constitutional boundaries.‖  Florida, 2011 WL 3519178 *61. 
The inference is particularly compelling here, where Congress has used an 
economic mandate to compel Americans to purchase and continuously maintain 
insurance from a private company.  We recognize the argument that, if states can 
issue economic mandates, Congress should be able to do so as well.  Yes, some 
states have exercised their general police power to require their citizens to buy 
certain products—most pertinently, for our purposes, health insurance itself.  But 
if anything, this gives us greater constitutional concern, not less.  Indeed, if the 
federal government possesses the asserted power to compel individuals to 
purchase insurance from a private company forever, it may impose such a mandate 
on individuals in states that have elected not to employ their police power in this 
manner.  After all, if and when Congress actually operates within its enumerated 
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commerce power, Congress, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, may ultimately 
supplant the states.  When this occurs, a state is no longer permitted to tailor its 
policymaking goals to the specific needs of its citizenry.  This is precisely why it 
is critical that courts preserve constitutional boundaries and ensure that Congress 
only operates within the proper scope of its enumerated commerce power. 
 
Id.  
 
 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the bedrock principle that ―[f]ederalism secures 
the freedom of the individual.  It allows States to respond, through the enactment of positive 
law, to the initiative of those who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times without 
having to rely solely upon the political processes that control a remote central power.‖  Bond, 
2011 WL 2369334 at *7.  The Individual Mandate eviscerates the fundamental protections of 
individual liberty that the Arizona Health Care Freedom Act provides to the citizens of the 
Arizona.  Notwithstanding any ―manifest purpose‖ Congress may have, Congress exceeded its 
constitutional bounds in enacting the Mandate and this Court must play a vital role in protecting 
liberty for Plaintiff Coons and all other Arizonans.  
 V.  SEVERABILITY 
 Defendants claim that the Individual Mandate ―is so closely and inextricably linked to the 
new guaranteed issue and community rating reforms that those reforms are not severable from 
that provision, so that a judgment holding the Mandate unconstitutional would also necessarily 
excise those provisions of PPACA as well, but only those provisions.‖  (Defs.‘ Mem. 38.)  
Plaintiffs agree in part with Defendants, but believe that Defendants, in their own self-interest, 
have drawn the line arbitrarily.  In fact, Defendants‘ drawing of this line flies in the face of the 
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entire scheme of their legal arguments in this and the other PPACA cases pending around the 
country.    
 Throughout their pleadings Defendants have cited to the fact that ―[b]efore enacting 
[PPACA], Congress gave detailed consideration to the reforms that would be needed to fix the 
health care market‘s interrelated structural and economic problems.‖  (Defs.‘ Mem. 3; Defs.‘ 
SOF ¶¶ 2, 29.)  Among the reforms Congress identified in enacting PPACA (Defs.‘ Mem. 3-6) 
are the establishment of health insurance exchanges (id. at 3-4; SOF ¶ 30), subsidized health 
insurance for eligible individuals who are subject to the Mandate (Defs.‘ Mem. 4), increases in 
Medicaid eligibility (id. at 4), as well as guaranteed issue and community ratings.  (Defs.‘ Mem. 
17.)  In fact, PPACA‘s health care exchanges are directly tied to implementing the Mandate as 
they facilitate the subsidy and purchase of health insurance that meets the federal government‘s 
requirements, such as guaranteed issue and community ratings.  For example, PPACA states that 
an exchange may not make available any health plan that is not a qualified plan.  42 U.S.C. § 
18031(d)(2)(B).  Further, the Act requires exchanges to maintain lists and report to the federal 
government individuals, by name and social security number, who are exempt from the Mandate 
as well as the names and social security numbers of individuals who have changed employers or 
otherwise have ceased coverage under a qualified plan during a plan year.  § 18031(d)(4)(H)(I). 
Therefore, according  Congress‘s own findings and Defendants‘ own legal theory, Congress 
considered all of these reforms, including the health insurance exchanges, to be as important as 
guaranteed issue and community ratings requirements, and interdependent with the Mandate.   
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 Congress itself spoke clearly about the issue of severability throughout its findings, 
which expressly state that the Mandate is ―essential‖ to the overall scheme established by 
PPACA.  (Defs‘ Mot. Dismiss 3.)  See also 42 U.S.C. § 18091(H) (the Individual Mandate is 
―an essential part of this larger regulation of economic activity and the absence of the 
requirement would undercut Federal regulation of the health insurance market‖); § 18091(E) 
(same); § 18091(J) (same).  Defendants confirm that the Mandate is essential to PPACA (Defs.‘ 
Mem. 3-5, 17) and have steadfastly maintained this position in the other PPACA litigation as 
well.  See, e.g., Florida, 2011 WL 285683 **36-7.  If the Court holds the Mandate 
unconstitutional, Defendants would have this Court sift through the entire massive law to 
determine which provisions are dependent and whether the law can stand without them.  It is 
more prudent to accept Defendants‘ premise that the Mandate is essential to the overall scheme 
and strike down the law in its totality, thereby allowing Congress to determine what should 
replace it. 
 Defendants cite to the Mead Corp. v. Tilley case, claiming it held that ―‗unexplained 
disappearance‘ of text during the progress of a bill is rarely a ‗reliable indicator of congressional 
intent.‘‖  (Defs.‘ Mem. 40) (quoting 490 U.S. 714, 723 (1989)).  But this citation is deceptive 
because Defendants conveniently omit critical words from the decision and substitute their own.  
In reality, the Mead Corp. case involved questions over the omission of a single word, which 
was contained in a House version of a bill, but dropped in the conference committee.  In that 
case, the Court held:  ―We do not attach decisive significant to the unexplained disappearance of 
one word from an unenacted bill because the ‗mute intermediate legislative maneuvers‘ are not 
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reliable indicators.‖  Mead Corp., 490 U.S. at 723 (emphasis added).   In this case, we are not 
dealing with the dropping of a single word, but an entire clause, which is further met with 
overwhelming legislative history establishing the unseverable nature of PPACA‘s overall 
scheme.  
 Accordingly, as set forth in Plaintiffs‘ Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting 
documents, should this Court strike down the Individual Mandate, and/or IPAB, Plaintiffs 
respectfully submit that the entire Act must be struck down as well. 
 VI. Discovery Relating to Mr. Coons is Neither Needed Nor Proper 
 
 Defendants state (albeit in a footnote), that though they ―believe that plaintiff Coons is 
subject to dismissal from this case for lack of standing even if all the proposed facts regarding 
Coons are true. . . . [i]f this Court does not agree with the defendants‘ position on this matter, 
however, the government respectfully requests that the Court ‗defer considering the‘ motions for 
summary judgment or ‗allow time . . . to take discovery.‘‖  (Defs.‘ L.R. 56.1(a) Statement 4 
n.1.)  However, Defendants did not file a Rule 56(f) motion, which they could have done, before 
they filed their opposition to Plaintiffs‘ Motion for Summary Judgment.5  Nor have Defendants 
availed themselves of Plaintiffs‘ several offers to work cooperatively on this issue.  
  In order to seek discovery in proceedings such as this, Rule 56(f) requires a party 
opposing a motion for summary judgment to ―show by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it 
                            
5
Despite the fact that Plaintiffs offered to produce for inspection documents that would show 
Mr. Coons‘ age, state of residence and income, Defendants‘ chose to instead claim ―lack [of] 
sufficient knowledge‖ to Plaintiffs‘ Rule 56.1(a) Statement that addressed these facts.  (See 
Plaintiffs‘ L.R. 56.1(a) Statement ¶¶ 1 and 5.)  Oddly, on the other hand, Defendants had no 
compunction admitting the same facts regarding Dr. Novack.  (Id. at ¶11.)  
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cannot present facts to justify its opposition.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).  Pursuant to Rule 56(g), an 
affidavit submitted under this rule must be submitted in good faith and must not be solely for 
delay (or the court must order the submitting party to pay the other party the reasonable 
expenses, including attorney‘s fees, it incurred as a result and the offending party or attorney 
may also be held in contempt).   
 The only discovery Defendants ever advised this Court that they purportedly needed was 
vaguely referred to in their June 23, 2011, Motion for Stay, and relates to some kind of 
―jurisdictional‖ discovery relating to Plaintiff Coons and his claim that he does not wish to 
purchase government-regulated and mandated health insurance, the money for which he would 
rather spend on growing his business.  (See Defs.‘ Mot. Stay 6) (Dkt. 6)).  Defendants claimed 
that ―[w]ithout any specific facts – such as the nature of Coons‘ current employment, a 
description of his ‗financial resources,‘ and his income and expenses – it is impossible to 
determine whether Coons will actually be subject to the minimum coverage provision when it 
takes effect in 2014.‖   However, after Defendants filed this Motion, Plaintiffs offered to 
produce information that would have addressed these questions.  Defendants declined this offer.  
(See Gr. Exh. 1.)  The Court denied Defendants‘ Motion to Stay on July 25, 2011. 
 After the Court denied Defendants‘ Motion to Stay and well before Defendants filed their 
opposition to Plaintiffs‘ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs again offered to produce such 
information, as well as to consider producing any other information Defendants might claim to 
need, all in an attempt to avoid unnecessary delay in this case.  (Id.)   In response, Defendants 
stated the following:  
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In terms of discovery, we have suggested in previous briefing the categories of 
information we might seek.  This could include information related to tax and 
income, any medical conditions, employment history, whether Mr. Coons has ever 
had health insurance before through an employer or otherwise, whether he has 
ever decided to drop health insurance and why, whether he has ever been to an 
emergency room or primary care physician, how he would pay for unexpected or 
catastrophic medical costs, whether he has recently applied for any jobs that might 
offer health insurance, his marital status, whether his spouse has health insurance 
that might cover Mr. Coons etc. 
 
(Id.) 
 First, of course, Defendants had never before identified the ―categories‖ of information 
they might seek to the Court or Plaintiffs, other than what they stated in their Motion to Stay.  
Second, Defendants rejected Plaintiffs‘ offers to work cooperatively on this matter.  Third, and 
most significant, Defendants‘ purported need for such discovery is belied by their own pleadings 
where they unequivocally state, ―Supreme Court precedent makes clear that the validity of a 
regulation under the Commerce Clause does not turn on a specific person‘s actual conduct or 
circumstance.‖  (Defs.‘ Mem. 11-12.)  Therefore, based on Defendants‘ own legal theory, 
whether and how Plaintiff Coons pays for health care is utterly irrelevant and immaterial in this 
case.  Such discovery would thus not be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence pursuant to Rule 26, and would therefore certainly not be worthy of 
delaying this case.  As Defendants themselves state, ―Although not all the uninsured receive 
health care services without paying [such as Mr. Coons], . . . Congress‘s commerce power 
plainly enables it to address economic behavior that, in the aggregate, imposes these substantial 
effects on the interstate market.‖  (See Defs.‘ Mot. Dismiss 2, 23.)  Accordingly, any journey 
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into Mr. Coons‘ personal medical history is wholly irrelevant, immaterial and would do nothing 
but delay the consideration of this case.
6
   
CONCLUSION 
 Wherefore, as set forth in Plaintiffs‘ Motion for Summary Judgment In Part and 
supporting memoranda and Rule 56.1(a) Statement, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that Plaintiffs‘ 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.  Plaintiffs further submit that Defendants‘ 
Motion for Summary and Motion to Dismiss should be denied.  
                            
6
Notwithstanding, in order to prevent even the possibility of delay, Plaintiff Coons is prepared to 
submit the attached affidavit, which states among other things, his marital status, that he has 
been self employed for nearly 15 years, that he has not had health insurance since he was a 
child, and has paid for the only medical care he has needed in the past decade (in 2006) with 
cash.  (See Exh. 2.)  These facts are not offered pursuant to Rule 56.1(a) or (b) because they are 
not material (and therefore not needed to decide the Motion).  Likewise, pursuant to the Rule, to 
the extent these facts would be considered background, they may be appropriately included in 
the summary judgment memorandum.  
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DATED: AUGUST 29, 2011 
 
         RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
        s/Diane S. Cohen  
        Clint Bolick (Arizona Bar No. 021684) 
        Diane S. Cohen (Arizona Bar No. 027791) 
        Nicholas C. Dranias (Arizona Bar No. 330033) 
        Christina Kohn (Arizona Bar No. 027983) 
         GOLDWATER INSTITUTE 
        500 E. Coronado Rd.   
        Phoenix, AZ 85004 
        P: (602) 462-5000  
        Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I, Diane Cohen, an attorney, hereby certify that on August 29, 2011, I electronically filed 
Plaintiffs‘ Reply in Further Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply in 
Opposition to Defendants‘ Motion for Summary Judgment, with the Clerk of the Court for the 
United States District Court, District of Arizona by using the CM/ECF system. 
 I further certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that 
service will be accomplished by the District Court‘s CM/ECF system. 
 
       s/ Diane S. Cohen  
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